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Beyond Neo-liberalism: Research Policies 
and Society. The Case of Japan
ALAIN-MARC RIEU
Abstract
The idea of decoupling is playing a major role in various interpretations of the 
present systemic crisis. This crisis is understood as an effect of neo-liberal poli-
cies, which have revolutionized economic systems since the 1980s. Decoupling 
indicates a qualitative change in the level of autonomy of the economic sphere 
in industrial societies. But a new level of differentiation also generates various 
types of recoupling, new forms of integration, cooperation and regulation recom-
posing social systems at another level. The goal of this article is ﬁrst to situate 
the idea of decoupling within its conceptual complex. Secondly, the ecological 
constraint is considered the source of this intense differentiation within social 
systems, which has intensiﬁed since the 1970s. Finally, based on the case of 
Japan, this paper explains why large-scale science and technology policies de-
veloped since the 1990s have to be understood as part of a recoupling process, 
a project to reconstruct and reach a social and economic coherence in the long 
term. Similar policies are now implemented by all major industrial nations. 
Such policies have the potential to overcome neo-liberalism's negative effects. 
Keywords: systemic crisis, ecological transition, neo-liberalism, science and technol-
ogy policy, Japan
Introduction: Social Systems under Stress
Decoupling is a notion commonly used in the present systemic crisis 
to describe the intense differentiation process restructuring social and 
industrial systems as well as their interactions. But beyond the present 
crisis, this decoupling process ﬁnds its roots in the ecological transi-
tion reshaping industrial societies since the 1970s. Social systems have 
responded to this stress by searching for new recoupling processes. Two 
paradigmatic responses can be observed and compared: the neo-liberal 
paradigm, which has revolutionized the world since the 1980s, and a 
research and innovation paradigm taking shape in Japan since the 1990s. 
This paper concentrates on this second paradigm because it is replicated 
by many industrial nations and new industrial states. Studying the case 
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of Japan illustrates the steps, problems and theoretical aspects of this 
paradigm. Comparing these two paradigms shows that the neo-liberal 
period is giving way to a new social and industrial model, still to be 
explored and fully conceptualized. 
Decoupling/Recoupling: A Model and Its Limitations
Like all crises before, the present systemic crisis has reopened the search 
for new concepts and explanations. The idea of 'decoupling' has been 
playing a major role, explicit and tacit, in analysis of the present crisis and 
in the conception of various policies designed to respond to this situation. 
The idea is simple and powerful: 'decoupling' designates an increased 
differentiation of a function within a given 'system' (organism or or-
ganization), the resulting transformation of this function and the ensuing 
reorganization of this system by integration, cooperation or regulation.1 
'Decoupling' is therefore used to describe the reciprocal evolution of vari-
ous systems (or subsystems in a system) within their environment. The 
idea of decoupling has a strong theoretical background: it belongs to the 
theory of complex adaptive systems reconstructed for research in human 
and social sciences. It carries therefore major presuppositions as well as 
a set of metaphors, models of explanation and scenarios for describing 
and explaining types of evolution, decoupling and recoupling processes. 
The main sequences of these processes are differentiation, specialization, 
autonomy and reconﬁguration. The basic model is the following: when a 
decoupling is happening within a system, this emergent ﬁeld of activity 
acquires a new degree of autonomy within this system; it builds its own 
rules, goals and interests. When this new ﬁeld (or function) reaches a cer-
tain degree of autonomy, it tends to impose its rules, goals and interests 
on other components of this system. This situation generates disorder, 
tensions and even conﬂicts; it can disarticulate the system but it can also 
lead to its reorganization into a new system. The notion of 'decoupling' 
and its source model provide interesting descriptions but there is no proof 
they provide an effective knowledge of these processes.
From the beginning of the 2007-2011 ﬁnancial, economic, social, mon-
etary and political crisis, the idea of decoupling was used to describe 
and predict its short-term impact and long-term consequences. The main 
prediction was a further and even ﬁnal decoupling between East Asian 
economies and the American economy, even all Western economies, 
as well as between China and the rest of the East Asian economies.2 A 
'new emerging order' was predicted, with China taking the lead and 
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eventually carrying the world economy out of recession. But when all 
constraints are taken into account, the validity of this prediction is not 
based on factual data but on the power of the theory behind the idea of 
decoupling. In fact, China's growth does not carry the world economy 
in proportion to its exports. The Chinese population saves too much 
due to underdeveloped social policies (education, health, pensions). It 
does spend enough to sustain the Chinese economy but not enough to 
sustain the world economy.
This example shows that the theory behind decoupling is neither false 
nor true. It opens and frames a range of discourses leading to description, 
explanation and prediction, which are not easily or directly falsiﬁed. It 
leads also to a powerful hypothesis taken for a standard explanation:3 
the regression of the emerging world from the 1980s to the late 1990s 
is explained by accumulated debts and deﬁcits, which have dried up 
investment capacities. These deﬁcits and debts had to be absorbed in 
order to restore conditions of economic growth and social develop-
ment. The nations that have achieved this restoration, along with China 
and Russia, are the new emerging economies. Wealth and power have 
been redistributed around the world. This transformation of the world 
economy partly explains the globalization process of the 1990s. But since 
the beginning of the 2007-2011 systemic crisis,4 the same explanation has 
been used for all industrial nations, including Japan. Various policies, 
which have been debated and implemented, reproduce the same set of 
presuppositions, turning an explanation into a prediction.
 The standard discourse is the following: for mature industrial nations, 
including Japan, the main effect of globalization has been increased 
competition and reduced competitiveness, rising amount of private 
and public debts, of deﬁcits and bad loans, which led to the present 
crisis. Therefore, in order to overcome their present crisis, Western 
economies need to absorb their debts, reduce their deﬁcits and restore 
their competitiveness. According to this scenario, East Asian economies 
should lead or participate in the world recovery and generate global 
economic growth. Interestingly, in this discourse, Japan remains para-
doxically outside and inside the present stage of the world system; it 
beneﬁts from the growth of East Asian economies but it also carries all 
the burden of a mature economy: massive debts, loss of competitive-
ness, unemployment and the related crisis of its social system. Indeed, 
no government in Japan seems able to ﬁnd a solution, to restore its 
ﬁnancial and economic situation and to reduce its dependence on East 
Asian economic growth.
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Such scenarios have obviously inspired and explain various Ameri-
can and European discourses and even policies since 2008. But their 
predictive value is weak. They do not take into account disruptive 
events because such events are unpredictable from the point of view 
of the theory. First, they do not explain the cause of the new dynamics 
of differentiation, which has since the 1970s deeply transformed socie-
ties and social systems as well as the world order. This main cause was 
the energy crisis and the rising cost of all energy and raw materials. 
Second, these scenarios do not explain the new level of decoupling of 
the economic sphere, which has revolutionized economies and societies 
since the 1980s, nor the formation of neo-liberal doctrines and practices, 
which have explained, justiﬁed and managed this decoupling. Finally, 
they concealed the long-term characteristic of the period starting in the 
late 1970s and 1980s and lasting until today: the conception and imple-
mentation in all industrial nations of large-scale research and innovation 
policies, which nowadays are supposed to drive their long-term future. 
These three evolutions and processes are closely related to each other. 
Therefore the real heuristic value of the theory of decoupling and re-
coupling is to analyze social and economic systems and their evolution 
from the point of view of disruptions and as a response to disruptions. 
This is the goal of this article.
The Great Disruption: The Ecological Challenge
The disruptive event at the source of the evolution transforming socie-
ties and economies, the conditions of their development and the world 
order, can now be identiﬁed as the ﬁrst crisis of energy and natural 
resources, which ﬁrst erupted in 1973 and lasted until 1982. In 40 years, 
this energy crisis has developed into a global 'ecological challenge'5 to 
all societies, transforming the course of their evolution and relations. 
The price of oil quadrupled in 1973. In 1981-1982, Iran's oil embargo was 
the main cause of the US 1982 recession. In retrospect, this crisis was 
much more than a problem of increased cost and free access. It touched 
the core of each industrial society, their infrastructure, which holds to-
gether the social, political and economic system. We now understand 
that since the end of the nineteenth century, and certainly after 1945, 
industrial economies could develop and grow only by controlling the 
cost of energy and raw materials. The worldwide control of cost, access 
and transport of natural resources was the condition for the develop-
ment of each industrial nation. Companies could make proﬁts because 
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of steady and strong demand based on a high level of employment and 
consumption as well as various social programs ﬁnanced by taxes on 
proﬁts, consumption and income. The welfare state, consumer society 
and market-based social capitalism are variations of the same system. 
The adjustment variable was the cost of energy and open access to all 
natural resources. This cost expressed the need for capitalist societies to 
sustain trade and industry in order to create jobs, to stimulate demand 
and maintain social stability. Managing such a system required a com-
prehensive state, a skilled and broad administration.
 This economic and social structure historically shaped its biophysical 
environment into its own ecology.6 The biophysical environment was 
reduced to raw materials and energy sources and so-called 'nature'. 
Some nations had the ﬁnancial and industrial, technological and military 
capacity to control the technology as well as the production sites, the 
transport and distribution of oil and other natural resources around the 
world. After 1945, the US possessed the power to control all capitalist 
economies and societies of the so-called 'free world'. This also explains 
US foreign policy until today and the size and level of deployment of 
US military around the world. It ﬁnally explains the organization of 
power within the US itself, and the role of energy and defence indus-
tries during the G.W. Bush administration. Since 1945, US foreign and 
military policy has had as a goal to secure access to and transport of 
energy and natural resources around the world.7 Today the cost of this 
control has become unsustainable. The energy and raw materials crisis 
of the 1970s was the moment when the core system of the 'free world', 
of all industrial nations under American military, industrial and tech-
nological hegemony, was destabilized and started deconstructing. In 
retrospect, this was not a 'crisis' to be overcome but the beginning of a 
historical transition. This transition opened a series of decoupling and 
rifts within this world system, which have been controlled, managed 
and repressed since the 1980s until the mid-2000s by US economic and 
military hegemony. Today these fault lines are in the open and fully 
recognized. Policies responding to this situation are still difﬁcult to con-
ceive, to justify and implement, because they touch the infrastructure 
of each industrial society.
 According to this perspective, what is at stake can be conceptualized 
in ﬁve points. First, the oil crisis of the 1970s has become, since the mid-
2000s, the ecological constraint, which is transforming the evolutionary 
trajectory of all industrial social and economic systems. The present 
economic crisis cannot be separated from the long-term ecological 
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constraint. Secondly, this situation generates serious problems within 
each social and economic system: pollution and health hazards, climate 
change, global warming, water and fertile land shortages, competition 
for access to rare minerals, etc. The ecological constraint acts both from 
outside and within each system. These systems respond and adapt by 
differentiation and reconﬁguration but this constraint reaches so deep 
into each system that their adaptive response is unpredictable. Thirdly, 
these disruptions within each social system have major geopolitical 
consequences. They intensify competition between industrial nations 
to secure the long-term conditions of national sovereignty, economic 
development and social stability. The fourth point concerns the present 
conjuncture: in this late 2011, the 2007-2011 crisis represses on the short-
term but reinforces on the long-term the ecological disruption. The 
interactions between these two crises are neither explicitly nor publicly 
debated. Governments and international institutions concentrate on the 
economic crisis: the risk is that short-term policies responding to the 
economic crisis might be counter-productive considering the long-term 
ecological transition.
 In summary, the decoupling/recoupling model has been reinter-
preted in order to take into account the ecological constraint. It now 
describes a type of adaptive evolution taking place at the level con-
necting a social and economic system to its biophysical environment. 
The problem now is to study types of evolution, which since the 1970s 
have been a response to the massive disruption situated at the core of 
all industrial societies. The main beneﬁt of this approach is to put in 
perspective the neo-liberal revolution, which has transformed the world 
since the 1980s. In retrospect, this revolution was and still is a systemic 
response to the long-term ecological constraint. But the same perspective 
makes us also understand that neo-liberal ideology and policies have 
not been and are not the only response to this constraint.
Two Systemic Responses. The Neo-liberal Paradigm
Today one can clearly identify two systemic responses to the decoupling 
generated by the ecological disruption, two different types of recoupling. 
Neo-liberal policies conceived and implemented since the 1980s, ﬁrst in 
the US and then in the rest of world, are the ﬁrst response. But science 
and technology policies conceived and implemented in Japan since the 
1980s constitute a second and alternative response. A 'Chinese wall' has 
never separated these two sets of theories, policies and practices. They 
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overlap and interact but they have different sources, histories and con-
sequences: this explains why they need to be contrasted from each other. 
They require different institutional arrangements and generate differ-
ent social and cultural evolutions. Most important, they are strongly 
competing with each other.8 Until now, nearly all policies designed to 
overcome the 2007-2011 crisis have been versions of the neo-liberal para-
digm. But in the last ten years, the research and innovation paradigm 
has been reinvented or reproduced by many industrial nations, includ-
ing South Korea, Singapore, China, and recently, India and Russia. For 
the moment, the divergence between the two paradigms is not seen as 
leading to contradiction. But science and technology policies designed 
in the US since the 1980s have very different sources, institutions and 
impact than the policies designed by Japan's techno-structure in the 
1990s. The present systemic crisis increases the divergence between 
these two paradigms. 
The response to the energy crisis differed from nation to nation. But 
each nation and government, each economy and each company had 
to face the same problem: the rising cost of energy and raw materials 
was increasing production costs, reducing national competitiveness 
and intensifying international competition. The second problem was to 
decide how those increased production costs could be translated into 
increased prices on the market. In all industrial nations, the economic 
crisis induced by rising energy costs was reinforcing competition and 
this competition had become destructive. In the late 1970s, companies 
were starting to close, unemployment was rising, and taxes were bring-
ing less revenue. Social policies were starting to show important deﬁcits. 
In order to remain competitive, companies and industries had to imagine 
how to reduce costs without reducing consumption and demand. 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, there were clearly three ways to 
sustain competitiveness and they have all been implemented to some 
degree. The ﬁrst solution was to stall and even lower salaries, the second 
solution was to reduce employment. A third solution was to reduce the 
cost of government and state administration in order to lower taxes, 
either taxes on citizens in order to strengthen demand, savings and in-
vestment, or taxes on businesses and proﬁts. This third solution included 
reducing social programs and beneﬁts in education, health, security and 
pensions. But there was also a fourth solution: to invest massively in sci-
ence and technology so that innovation would neutralize added energy 
costs and increase productivity by creating new industries, industrial 
processes and services, which would reduce dependency on natural 
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resources and alleviate ecological constraints (pollution, global warm-
ing, shortages). This fourth solution is based on new models, theories 
and policies, mainly the theory of 'national system of innovation'9 and 
a new discipline, the economics of innovation. Until today, industrial 
nations have not found any alternative solutions. They have only found 
equilibrium between these four possibilities according to their own 
history and culture. For instance, in the case of France, budget deﬁcits 
started to increase in 1973 and 1974, unemployment rose to around 10 
per cent of the active population in the early 1980s and stayed at this 
level until now, with rare momentary reductions.
This ﬁrst response is well known and will receive only a short sum-
mary here because this article focuses on the research and innovation 
paradigm, speciﬁcally, on its Japanese version. The reason is this para-
digm is replicated by a growing number of governments and the neo-
liberal paradigm might be receding in the near future. Neo-liberalism is 
a vision of society, of individuals in society, of institutions and historical 
evolution. As proven by its amazing resilience, it is not a theory easily 
falsiﬁed by events or facts. Neo-liberalism has been constantly reformu-
lated to overcome all criticism. According to a complex adaptive systems 
perspective, neo-liberalism is the name given in the late 1970s to a new 
level of decoupling10 between the economy, society and the state (both 
the government and the administration). This decoupling was not the 
triumph of an ideology or political party but it was, as explained above, 
a response within social and economic systems to increased costs of en-
ergy and natural resources. When Ronald Reagan was elected president 
in 1980, the relation between the energy crisis and his program was 
not explicit: the US economy was simply in crisis, its hegemony was 
questioned and had to be restored. But government was considered too 
big, too costly and inefﬁcient. Social programs were viewed not only 
as too costly but even counter-productive: in time of crisis, protecting 
people from economic change was preventing them from becoming 
full economic actors ﬁnding solutions to their own problems. Decou-
pling (the words used were 'freeing' and 'deregulation') the economy 
was until today the ideology of successive American administrations. 
From a systemic point of view, this increased level of autonomy of the 
economic sphere has been the response of our institutional systems to 
a long-term ecological mutation. 
Neo-liberalism became, in the early 1980s, a model and a norm, which 
has revolutionized economies and societies around the world. The US 
identiﬁed itself with this norm as an expression of US economic and 
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political power. Successive US administrations tried to persuade other 
nations to implement reforms to reorganize their economy, society 
and government according to this imagined American model and to 
emancipate their economic system from historical constraints in or-
der to become similar or compatible with this American model.11 But 
the main target of these reforms was East Asia, and within East Asia, 
Japan. Even if major reforms were achieved, especially after the 2007 
East Asian crisis, these nations tacitly resisted any real convergence 
with the US neo-liberal model (Lee 2008; for a different angle, see Dore 
2004). The loudest advocate for liberal reforms in East Asia has been 
Junichiro Koizumi, Japan's prime minister from 2001 to 2006, but in 
retrospect, his achievement is considered ambiguous and even weak 
(Vogel 2006).12 Neo-liberal reforms were more a political platform to 
win elections than a program to be implemented. Today, the 2008-2011 
crisis appears as a long-term consequence of the 'neo-liberal turn' of the 
late 1970s. But neo-liberal policies are still considered the paradigm to 
conceive, negotiate and implement proper answers to the crisis, plus 
an added level of legal regulation.13
 In the early 1980s, a decisive evolution reshaped the US economy. 
As explained above, science and technology policy is one of the four 
potential responses to the ecological constraint and its decoupling ef-
fect. Until the 1980s, the framework in the US to design and implement 
science and technology policies remained within the trajectory opened 
after 1945 by the 'new frontier' ideology, which led to the creation of 
the National Science Foundation in 1950. Science, technology and their 
institutions remained under the control of the US political, defence and 
industrial system in order to participate in their strategy for reaching 
their goals. Within the new neo-liberal paradigm, their role, organization 
and management became a major issue: they had to share its models and 
be reformed according to its speciﬁc goals. In 1980, the Bayh-Dole Act 
reformed the post-World War II industrial property regime regulating 
the availability and circulation of 'inventions' produced in universities 
by public and private sector cooperation. This reform gave universities 
the right to sell to private companies licenses of innovations produced 
on campuses and ﬁnanced by public funds. In ten years, this reform 
resulted in a quantum leap in science and technology. It transformed 
universities and their relations to industry and government. It led to the 
formation of new industries, mainly in information and communication 
technology (ICT) and biotechnology, which changed the world. It ex-
tended and reinforced American science and technology hegemony. 
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But to sustain this 'advance' and level of progress in the long term 
proved to be a major challenge after the 2000 internet bubble burst. This 
'new economy' proved fragile and new reforms were needed. Since 
the 1980s, universities, research institutes, innovation processes and 
education have undergone deep reforms according to the neo-liberal 
paradigm, sharing progressively its models of organization and man-
agement, but also its goals and values. These reforms had a similar ef-
fect on universities and education in general as they did on society and 
ﬁrms: some of them may have become more efﬁcient, competitive or 
successful but most of them were disorganized, without a clear sense 
of their goals and responsibilities in society as a whole. The neo-liberal 
decoupling process generated successive reforms, but no clear and ef-
fective recoupling process can be observed. It does not seem to reach 
any end; it does not seem to touch a bottom for rebound.
The Research and Innovation Paradigm:  
The Case of Japan
Neo-liberalism is an ideology and an institutional arrangement charac-
terized by an increased level of autonomy of the economic sphere, which 
emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s as a response to the ecologi-
cal challenge. But there was another answer to this growing ecological 
challenge. An alternative response was imagined and implemented in 
Japan. Still there is no Japanese model to be imitated and reproduced, 
but a Japanese experience to learn from. My goal now is to formulate 
this alternative paradigm. Developed ﬁrst in Japan, it has been repro-
duced or rediscovered by all industrial nations since the late 1990s. 
This paradigm has become a model of development for the European 
Union and for many advanced new industrial nations, for South Korea, 
Taiwan, Singapore, and even China.
 In the case of Japan, the research and innovation paradigm developed 
in four steps. The ﬁrst step was a diagnosis and a response designed 
around 1972 by Japan's techno-structure, even before the beginning of 
the energy crisis in 1973.14 The energy crisis and the rising cost of all 
raw materials from 1973 to 1982 were undermining the fundamentals 
of Japan's economy, rebuilt with great difﬁculty and effort after 1945. 
Japan was importing nearly all its energy and raw materials. The shock 
was intense and it concerned not only energy supplies. The threat was 
considered as serious for Japan's sovereignty as the threat of colonization 
in the mid-nineteenth century. The response to the crisis was organized 
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and managed by the celebrated MITI (Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry) in close cooperation with the major industrial and com-
mercial ﬁrms, universities and 'national laboratories'. In early 1980s, 
this response was considered a success. In a few years, the Japanese 
economy had gone through an industrial and technological mutation; 
its dependency on imported energy and raw materials had been control-
led by a major increase in productivity based on automation. Japan's 
coherent and successful response was studied in great detail. It became 
the model of a national public policy managing long-term economic 
development on the basis of a science and technology policy geared 
toward innovation. The Japanese experience led to the construction of 
a powerful concept and inﬂuential public policy model (Freeman 1987, 
1988), the 'national system of innovation'.15
This reorientation and reorganization of Japan's economy has had long-
term consequences, lasting until today. The initial strategy was a pro-
gressive conversion of all industries toward production of higher added 
value and new industrial processes. Computerization was intended ﬁrst 
to compensate the rising cost of all natural resources but also to reorient 
industry toward activities and products where these costs were neutral 
or neutralized. In summary, the strategy was to substitute high added-
value production for natural resources and labour. From the beginning, 
it included the project to retrain labour in order to orient workers toward 
high-value activities. This strategy was also based on the development of 
a strong microprocessor industry as well as large consumer electronics 
ﬁrms for worldwide markets (Fransman 1990). Such a coordinated strate-
gy could only be conceived and achieved by an institutional environment 
organized around a powerful and dedicated administration (Johnson 
1982).16 In the early 1980s, Japan's techno-structure had responded to 
the crisis by establishing an endogenous dynamic of great intensity and 
spectacular success. This 'virtuous cycle' is the core of Japan's economic 
growth in the early 1980s. It is also the core of Japan's economic resilience 
after the 1985 endaka, the abrupt rise of the yen decided by the Group of 
Five (G5) to curb and control Japanese competitiveness. A new paradigm 
had been invented in Japan: responding to the ecological constraint and 
to economic competition by organizing a high-value-added economy 
based on research and innovation (Sakaiya 1991; see also Kodama 1991, 
1995).17 This paradigm implied quite a different institutional environ-
ment and policy matrix from neo-liberalism.
Japan's success in the early 1980s induced a strong wave of chauvin-
ism: Japan was unique and the best.18 But administrative, academic and 
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business elites did not share this euphoria, at least not in private. What 
had been achieved was also a source of worry. The Japanese economy 
was fully riding the 'third wave' (Tofﬂer 1980),19 the last technological 
wave, information and communication technology. For Japan, a 'post-
industrial society' was an 'information society' (Ito 1991). The infrastruc-
ture of such a society, the conditions of its development, was a generic 
technological innovation. But this technological wave was not born in 
Japan: it was imported from the US and exploited in Japan. Japan had 
been able to organize an institutional structure based on patterns of 
collaboration between laboratories in universities and ﬁrms and public 
agencies. This collaborative structure, a real 'ecosystem of innovation', 
had been capable of identifying the potential of a new technology, organ-
izing research and development capacities to explore this technology in 
depth, and making and applying innovations to many different ﬁelds, 
leading to new industrial processes, new departments in existing ﬁrms 
(even new ﬁrms) and ﬁnally new products commercialized worldwide. 
If China is today the world factory, Japan was in the 1980s an innovation 
factory. Japan was in advance, not in the production of new knowledge, 
but in the transformation of this knowledge into new products.
 For the Japanese techno-structure, this very success was creating 
dependency on those nations at the source of these technological muta-
tions, namely the US. Technological dependency could be in the future as 
serious a threat as energy dependency in the 1970s, even of colonization 
in the mid-nineteenth century. A response took shape and led to new 
policy at the end of 1980s: Japan had to prepare for the new technological 
wave and to create the conditions to produce this next wave in order to 
establish its long-term endogenous economic and social development. 
The next wave did not have to be Japanese or to come from Japan. But 
Japan's research and teaching institutions had to participate from the 
beginning in the invention of this next wave, whatever it would be and at 
whatever cost. This is the second step in the formation of the research and 
innovation paradigm, which does not fully ﬁt in the national system of 
innovation concept. Japan had to fully collaborate in advanced research 
in all domains. But in order to achieve this goal, reforms were necessary: 
universities and research institutes had to be reorganized and opened 
to worldwide collaboration. The dynamics of a new technology was so 
powerful and disruptive, its development costs and the complexity of 
its emergence were so great, that the cost of catching up had become too 
high and would soon become impossible to match. What was at stake 
was Japan's future as a fully sovereign nation. 
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This diagnosis was not contradicted, but to the contrary, was con-
ﬁrmed by the 'bubble crisis', the ﬁnancial, economic, social and political 
crisis, which erupted in 1991. Its effects have lasted up to today.20 The 
1990s opened the age of large-scale science and technology programs 
(Rieu 1996). It was a difﬁcult choice, difﬁcult to organize, ﬁnance and 
manage.21 But it was also fully consistent with Japan's modern history 
and with the role of technology in its modernization. An economist, 
Matsumoto Kazuo, best expressed the situation: 'Technology is Japan's 
only resource. It is time now to develop it'.22 To summarize this new 
situation, until the 1980s, development was prevalent over research; the 
goal now was to reach a stage where research done in Japan's leading 
universities would feed Japan's industrial and social innovation. This 
evolution was called in Japan, the emergence of a 'post-information 
society' or  more adequately, a 'knowledge society'.
 In the early 1990s, the 'bubble' crisis forced the administration to re-
structure Japan's research system. The proliferation of programs in the 
1980s was costly and inefﬁcient and far below expectation. Because of the 
number of partners (ministries, companies, universities, etc.) involved and 
the ﬁelds concerned, two large programs were organized: the Industrial 
Science and Technology Frontier Program and the New Sunshine Program for 
new energy sources and environmental technologies. Their demarcation 
shows Japan's long-term priorities: the goal was explicitly to respond to 
the ecological constraint by articulating green research and industry in 
the hope of building a different social and economic system. This restruc-
turing led to a ﬁnal reform establishing a new and coherent research and 
innovation system of unprecedented scale (Rieu 2007). The goal for Japan 
was not simply to have a strong science and technology policy, but to 
become an open system of innovation, articulating the national interest and 
international cooperation. The objective was to build this policy within the 
institutional system and in return to adapt the institutional system to the 
role and output of this policy. In 1995, Basic Law for Science and Technology 
was passed. According to this law, three basic plans were developed from 
1996 to 2011. Spending on science and technology increased from 12.6 
trillion yen 1995 to 17.6 for the ﬁrst plan, 21.1 trillion for the second and 
21 trillion for the third plan. The size of these budgets tells little about the 
plans themselves, their construction, intentions and internal dynamics. 
The ﬁrst two plans had as goals to reform Japan's system of research, in-
novation and education. The third basic plan opened a different dynamic: 
to transform the interactions between research and innovation activities 
within both society and the economy. 
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The First Basic Plan, from ﬁscal 1996 to 2001, aimed to open a new 
phase by increasing the public budget for science and technology 60 per 
cent in ﬁve years. In spite of the crisis, the budget was granted. The plan 
had as a priority, to modernize research infrastructures and create new 
ones. This explains why the ﬁrst plan was sometimes called 'the concrete 
plan'. At the end of the 1990s, a major change had taken place throughout 
Japanese society, in the media and the techno-structure: it became clear 
that this crisis had no bottom and would have no end. It was not a crisis 
that could be overcome so that Japan would return to its former situa-
tion. There would be no return, but rather a transition toward a different 
society and economy. Anxiety was high but people started to look ahead 
instead of looking back. Reforms had to be experimented with and not 
feared, even if nobody knew which would be the right ones. This was 
the third step, and this spirit continues until today. 
The Second Basic Plan, from 2001 to 2006, did not express this new 
attitude as it was too soon. It had as its goal, to reform in-depth the uni-
versities, to draw a line between public and private universities and to 
give public universities ﬁnancial and administrative autonomy. Public 
universities had to become accountable for their management (includ-
ing proﬁtability) and for their research and teaching performance (Oba 
2010; see also Woolgar 2007). This reform should lead to a higher degree 
of mobility for professors and researchers. To stimulate research and 
open new ﬁelds, a Center of Excellence (COE) program was established 
to provide ﬁnancial incentives for competition among innovative aca-
demic projects. The effective outcome of such reforms is always below 
expectation. Nonetheless, the COE program has stimulated innovative 
interdisciplinary research projects in many ﬁelds.
The Third Basic Plan, from 2006 to 2011, was launched in March 
2006 (NISTEP 2005). Its conception and goals were different from the 
two previous plans. It expressed this third step, a new attitude and a 
collective will to lead the transition to its end. It was based on a large 
inquiry to identify both the worldwide state of research and the spe-
ciﬁc needs of the Japanese population. The goal was to respond to the 
economic and ﬁnancial situation of the nation and to take into account 
its social constraints: the aging population, the demographic decline 
and low birth rate, the ecological transition, the rising cost and growing 
scarcity of energy, increased competition with the Chinese economy 
and growing international instability.23 At mid-course, the third plan 
was disrupted by the 2007 systemic crisis. Japan was hit where it hurt 
the most: its economy was partially restructured and since 2004 and 
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2005 it had started to grow. But the year 2008 proved how fragile this 
growth and recovery were; high-tech industries were far too depend-
ent on foreign markets and on global economic growth. The time of an 
export-oriented economy based on increasingly higher-value-added 
industries and products could no longer sustain Japan's long-term 
economic and social development. Furthermore, industrial nations had 
one after another implemented the same strategy since the late 1990s. 
This strategy was understood in Japan as leading to a dead end. The 
time had come to escape from this trap. The resulting adaptation and 
revision strongly inﬂuenced the conception of the next plan. The third 
plan was expressing what should be called the social turn of science 
and technology policy in Japan. This is a fourth step, leading beyond the 
national system of innovation model.
The Fourth Basic Plan (2011-2015) was supposed to be launched in 
March 2011, a few days before the Kanto-Tohoku earthquake and the 
Fukushima catastrophe. It was postponed and then revised. Naoto 
Kan's government validated the ﬁnal version of the fourth plan on 19 
August 2011. In order to respond to the 2008 crisis, discussions have 
been far more open and inclusive because the fourth plan has to make 
a real difference in order to justify the same level of public investment. 
People will have to see changes in their daily lives, their standard of 
living and in public services. According to available documents, the 
plan will intensify the third plan's orientation toward solving pressing 
problems. Small and medium-size companies, and even new industries, 
new jobs, new services responding to the present needs of the popula-
tion are expected to be created or reinforced. The fourth plan is raising 
high expectations  and it is responding to the growing disappointment 
with science and technology policies by introducing a criterion of 'social 
accountability'. In summary, innovation has to make sense and sell, to 
produce growth, create jobs and satisfy real needs. Beneath such market-
ing and political slogans, a real problem is raised by the present Japanese 
techno-structure: the present systemic crisis requires a deep revision of 
the economic strategy based on scientiﬁc progress and technological 
innovation designed since the mid-1990s.
 An intense debate has taken place since 2008. A consensus has been 
reached between the various institutions and interests participating in 
the conception, ﬁnancing and implementation of the Fourth Basic Plan.24 
According to this 'new paradigm of innovation', and in order to 'beneﬁt 
the Japanese people', specialists in policy design need to learn how to 
articulate and manage different goals within the same policy. These 
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policies have to respond to practical goals and at the same time sustain 
world-class research. These objectives require innovations in research 
governance: a different way of conceiving, organizing and managing 
research and innovation processes has to be implemented. Because no 
models are available, the only solution is to experiment. No version of 
the top-down 'linear model'25 can be expected to work. Discussions and 
various documents, debates and reports26 indicate that the present goal 
is to identify real social needs and to satisfy these needs by creating new 
products responding to present demand and values, needs and buy-
ing power. In this perspective, the neo-liberal conception of the market 
is not the centre of a social system: society, people in their daily lives 
and problems, are considered the centre of society. The problem is not 
to reform an existing 'national system of innovation' but to reorganize 
innovation from the point of view of the society. Debates and research 
show that the goal is to negotiate and organize the emergence of a new 
'innovation ecosystem' within society itself. This is a major social and 
epistemic experiment: to learn how to bring into a constructive debate 
various actors and partners from very different sectors and with different 
interests and values.27 It is also a major challenge. After such cumulative 
crises, many Japanese think they have no choice.
Finally, the social turn is a response to the ecological challenge, which 
will in the coming decades transform all social and economic systems. 
Before the earthquake, the Council for Science and Technology Policy 
selected two priority ﬁelds:28 energy and environment technologies and 
health and bioscience. This partition reproduces the 1992 distinction 
between the Industrial Science and Technology Frontier Program and the 
New Sunshine Program. But today in 2011, 'society' and 'ecosystem of 
innovation' are the two notions supposed to operate recoupling by articu-
lating these two main research ﬁelds on practical social and industrial 
solutions. The ecological challenge is supposed to integrate research, 
the economy and society.
 The Fourth Basic Plan was considered both a necessity and an ex-
periment: a necessity to respond to the 2008 crisis but also an experi-
ment because the plan had to deliver tangible results by articulating 
long-term research goals and the realities of present Japan. Its August 
revision conﬁrms the general orientation of the Fourth Basic Plan. It is 
focused on reconstruction with the goal of 'revitalizing Japan' through 
basic research within the 'development of policy creation and promotion 
with society'. This is easier said than done. By an unpredictable twist 
of fate, what was considered an experiment became on 11 March 2011 
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a necessity: relocating people and activities and rebuilding the Kanto-
Tohoku regions will have ripple effects throughout Japan. This cannot 
be achieved without evaluating and taking into account the daily needs 
of the victims and all people affected by the disaster. The social turn 
of research and innovation policies in Japan introduces a new step in 
the conception, management and evaluation of research and innova-
tion policies. It develops on two legs. It intends to ﬁnd solutions to the 
present systemic crisis from the point of view of society. It responds to 
the ecological challenge by criticizing and opposing the interests and 
power of utilities companies. The Fukushima catastrophe has forever 
transformed the relations between government, nuclear technology, 
utilities companies and society. The green turn of both Japanese indus-
try and society will intensify. It is a ﬁeld where Japanese innovation 
practices will probably thrive, create jobs, investment opportunities and 
eventually new industries. The crisis and the catastrophe are forcing 
Japan to be creative and ﬁnd new solutions. This is a new attitude: the 
goal is not to compete, it is ﬁrst to solve problems. Maybe Japanese 
society needed this impulse to overcome its deconstruction. The social 
and green turn, their conjunction and interactions are restructuring an 
innovation system already reformed in the 1990s. But the real challenge, 
in the present reconstruction phase, is to progress and implement it 
fast. 
Conclusion: Beyond Neo-liberalism
An intense decoupling process has revolutionized industrial systems 
since the 1980s. Its source is to be found in the growing ecological con-
straint on all economies and societies. But this decoupling process has 
also opened, since the late 1970s, the search for a recoupling process to 
control and master the internal deconstruction of social and economic 
systems and increased international competition. Two sets of alterna-
tive answers can be observed and compared. Both paradigms have in 
common reliance on innovation for sustaining growth and competitive-
ness. But these two solutions compete with each other. The neo-liberal 
paradigm took shape in the US in the early 1980s. It ﬁnds a response by 
increasing the autonomy of the economic sphere within a social system: 
research and innovation institutions have been progressively reformed 
in order to feed the economy. Since the early 2000s, science and technol-
ogy policies have failed to reshape the US economy. Neo-liberal policies 
seem to inspire an endless decoupling: no ground for rebound has been 
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found. The research and innovation paradigm was ﬁrst developed in 
Japan in the mid-1990s. It was expected to ﬁnd a solution by designing 
large-scale science and technology policies to create the conditions for 
endogenous and long-term social and economic growth. Today, the neo-
liberal paradigm seems to be the cause of the present systemic crisis. In 
the last ten years, most industrial nations have adopted a version of the 
research and innovation paradigm. 
Japan is often considered a dragon of the last century. But by inventing 
such a solution to its complex crisis, Japan is in advance and a forerunner, 
whatever the difﬁculties and results of its fourth Basic Plan. Reforms 
have been many and others are coming, but they all have for a goal 
to reach a recoupling process. It is impossible to predict what Japan's 
fourth Basic Plan will achieve. But the social turn of Japan's science and 
technology policy is an experiment to be carefully followed in order to 
learn from it. It is an alternative to the neo-liberal paradigm and a step 
beyond the neo-liberal era. 
Alain-Marc Rieu is professor of contemporary philosophy and science studies 
at the University of Lyon and senior researcher at the Institute of East-Asian 
Study at the Ecole Normale Supérieure de Lyon. Since the 1970s he has been 
studying the mutation of the role, conception and organization of knowledge 
in advanced industrial societies. He now concentrates on a comparative study 
of science and technology policies (http://w7.ens-lyon.fr/amrieu/).
NOTES
1  The system model used in this paper is mainly derived from the work of H. Matu-
rana and F. Varela on autopoietic processes: a system is what associates a structure 
to its environment (see Varela, Maturana & Uribe 1974). The perspective ﬁnds its 
root in the work of Michel Foucault, in his conceptions of 'governmentality' and 
power. It is also inﬂuenced by Niklas Luhmann's work (see Raasch 2001). The idea 
of decoupling is mainly based on neo-Darwinian and non-Darwinian models of 
evolution (see Depew & Weber 1995). 
2  A typical example is Anderson (2009).
3   For instance, Anderson (2009).
4   Now (Fall 2011), the crisis is systemic because it is all at once ﬁnancial, economic, 
social and monetary. It became political in 2010 when the solution to the 2008 ﬁ-
nancial crisis led to a sovereign debt crisis, which concerns the basic functions of 
all nation-states: security, defense, social policies, education.
5  This issue and the crucial role of science policy to bring solutions is fully identiﬁed 
in Freeman & Soete (1999). 
6  In the sense, ecology is deﬁned as an 'associated environment' (milieu associé), a 
notion derived from Gilbert Simondon (1969). The world is composed of various 
ecologies connected (or not) to each other. 
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7  It was the object of President Eisenhower's famous 1961 farewell address on the 
'military-industrial complex'. See also Johnson (2004).
8  Concerning the interaction and competition between national systems of innovation 
and science and technology policies, see Rieu (2008). 
9  For a recent synthesis, see Lundvall (2010); for a retrospective view, see Godin 
(2009). 
10  I do not refer here to the further decoupling within the economic sphere since the 
1980s of ﬁnancial activities from industrial activities. This further decoupling has 
triggered the present crisis and is the main obstacle to overcoming it.
11  Neo-liberal theory and policies were considered as the source of the globalization 
process and the last step of European modernity and American hegemony (see 
Shani 2003). The present systemic crisis has intensiﬁed this debate in all East Asian 
nations.
12  Evaluating the Koizumi legacy is a continuing debate inside and outside Japan.
13  On the presuppositions and various types of neo-liberalism, see Foucault (2004). 
Half the book contrasts German neo-liberalism with American neo-liberalism.
14  A report for MITI under the direction of Watanabe Chihiro, Industry-ecology: intro-
duction of ecology into industrial policy (English summary), was published in Tokyo in 
May 1972. It deals with the severe industrial pollution of the post-war reconstruction 
(cited by Erkman 1997).
15  For a recent synthesis, see Lundvall (2010), note 9.
16  Johnson (1982) studies the formation of the institutional system (the 'developmental 
state') before and after the Paciﬁc War, which would respond to the energy crisis of 
the 1970s.
17  Sakaiya Taichi explicitly formulated this paradigm in his book The Knowledge Value 
Revolution (1991). He became director of the Economic Planning Agency in the late 
1990s.  
18  Many specialists of Japan reinforced this exaltation (see Abegglen & Stalk 1985; 
Prestowitz 1988). 
19  Tofﬂer's, The Third Wave (1980) had a major inﬂuence in Japan.
20 The Japanese Democratic Party, which came into power in September 2009, started 
to question and evaluate the goals, funding and reforms of Japan's system of re-
search, training and innovation. The 11 March 2011 catastrophe is reinforcing this 
critical evaluation. Since Fall 2010, universities have proven they constitute a strong 
lobby. 
21  A Japanese school of technology management was organized under the direction 
of Watanabe Chihiro, a former MITI executive, at Tokyo Institute of Technology.
22  The Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo), 11 January 1994.
23  Reports and studies are available at the website of National Institute for Science and 
Technology Policy (NISTEP): www.nistep.go.jp/. 
24  I have drawn from articles and presentations by Arimoto Tateo, Director of the Re-
search Institute of Science and Technology for Society (RISTEX), Japan Science and 
Technology Agency, and from conversations with Mrs. Harayama Yuko, Tohoku 
University and OECD. See Arimoto (2006).  
25  The 'linear model' supposes the transfer from research institutions to ﬁrms, which 
in turn develop new products and services and ﬁnally sell them on the market. See 
Godin (2009), note 9.
26  See the RISTEX website: http://www.ristex.jp/EN/. 
27 This situation is similar to experiments in Japan and elsewhere described by Callon, 
Lascoumes & Barthe (2009). 
28  http://www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/english/policy/reports.html.
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